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Access and Lobbying:
Looking Beyond the Corruption Paradigm'
by DORIE APOLLONIO, * BRUCE E. CAIN,** and LEE DRUTMAN***
Introduction
Political reform often means election reform, and for good reason.
Democracies derive their legitimacy from elections. Electoral rules
determine voter and candidate eligibility, the amount and type of resources
that candidates use, the way votes are counted, and, of course, ultimately
how a winner is determined. The direction of modem American electoral
reform has been towards increasing citizen participation and procedural
fairness, aided to a considerable degree by the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act.
Still, many OECD2 democracies like the United States have evolved in
ways that blur the distinction between electoral and post-electoral phases,
and that diminish to some degree the significance of elections in
determining policy. Electoral tactics, polling information, and the guidance
of campaign consultants are now more systematically incorporated into
governance than ever before, creating the so-called "permanent
campaign."3  Even more importantly, the battle over policy is often not
1. This paper was presented at the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly's Spring 2008
Symposium. The Symposium was entitled "Frontiers in Democracy: Voters, Election, and
Reform" and occurred on February 29, 2008 at the University of California, Hastings College of
the Law.
* Heller Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, and Executive
Director, University of California, Washington Center.
** Assistant Adjunct Professor of Clinical Pharmacy at the University of California, San
Francisco. Dr. Apollonio's research was funded by the California Tobacco-Related Disease
Research Program (# 15KT-0145).
• Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.
2. For more information on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development,
see http://www.oecd.org.
3. See, e.g., Joe Klein, The Perils of the Permanent Campaign, TIME, Oct. 30, 2005,
available at http://www.time.com/time/columnist/klein/article/0,9565,1124237,00.html.
finally determined by an election even when one party dominates at the
polls, and there are now more post-election opportunities to influence
decision making at many levels of government than ever before. Trends
towards more administrative decentralization, open meeting laws and
transparency keep policy debates alive at much later stages of the
policymaking process than before. The term for this phenomenon is
"advocacy democracy." 4
As part of this trend, lobbying in the United States has expanded
dramatically. 5 The electoral mandate for most legislators is very limited,
especially in an era characterized by thirty-second sound bites and
consultant crafted messages. Issues that are covered in modern campaigns
are but a small fraction of the issues that legislators have to decide between
elections.6 Moreover, the range and complexity of bills has increased over
time. Washington continues to attract bright and well-educated young
people to take low-paying, demanding staff jobs, but constant turnover is a
resultant fact of life. Lobbyists, many of them former staff and Members
of Congress who move into the private sector for higher pay, provide
valued expertise and perspective on the issues and regulatory matters that
come before Congress and executive agencies.7
For all the justifiable attention given to the rising costs of elections, it
pales in comparison to the amount of money invested in lobbying. If
money reveals preferences, then lobbying is apparently thought to be an
extremely important means of influence for the corporations, organizations
and individuals who retain lobbyists. As the number of lobbyists and
organizations that hire them continues to grow, questions about their
activities and influence have also mounted. And then, as is so often the
case, scandal opened the door to more regulation.
8
The audacious actions of a Republican lobbyist, Jack Abramoff,
brought attention to prevailing lobbying practices. 9 Many Washington
lobbyists complain that Abramoff was an outlier, certainly not
4. See generally DEMOCRACY TRANSFORMED?: EXPANDING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES
IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES (Bruce E. Cain et al. eds., 2003).
5. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Bimbaum, The Road to Riches Is Called K Street: Lobbying Firms
Hire More, Pay More, Charge More to Influence Government, WASH. POST, June 22, 2005, at
AO 1.
6. Compare, for example, speeches at the 2008 Democratic National Convention,
http://www.demconvention.com/speeches/ (the limited number of issues addressed in speeches)
and speeches at the Republican National Convention, http://www.gopconvention2008.com/, with
the variety of issues debated and reported in the Congressional Record, a searchable form of
which is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/rl 10query.html.
7. See Bimbaum, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. See infra Part I.
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representative of the profession as a whole, and that the excesses of a few
led to restrictions on the many. The new lobbying rules enacted in 2007
tried to fix what the Abramoff scandal revealed was broken.' 0 Whereas the
earlier wave of lobbying reforms focused primarily on registration and
disclosure, the new restrictions limit actions (gifts, trips, meals, and
campaign finance activities) that abet or give the appearance of abetting
lobbying efforts."1
How should we think about lobbying regulation? Is it merely
derivative of bribery or campaign finance regulation, or is it unique in any
important ways? What are the goals to be achieved? What approaches to
lobbying reform by the courts and political reformers make the most sense
given constitutional limitations? In the sections that follow, we will first
review the new regulations and their goals, showing how they relate to the
Abramoff scandal and what is missing from them. Then we will consider
the fundraising question in some detail, looking at whether there is a case
for further regulation. Third, we will consider a question not addressed in
the new regulations-i.e., whether the unequal balance of lobbying activity
in the direction of corporations and others with direct economic interests
produces a systemic policy bias. And finally, we will consider what
approach might be taken to address this problem.
I. Abramoff, Cunningham, and the Impetus for Reform
Reforms are often prompted by scandals because such events shed
light on unsavory political practices and regulatory gaps and open up
windows of opportunity for reformers to overcome the forces of inertia and
self interest that preserve the status quo. This is the case with the Senate
and the House versions of ethics reforms passed in the wake of the
Abramoff and Cunningham scandals.' 2
Randall Duke Cunningham pled guilty in 2005 to taking $2.4 million
in bribes, fraud, and tax evasion.13  The Cunningham case was mostly
10. Memorandum from Hogan & Hanson, LLP, House and Senate Ethics Rules Change
(Mar. 2007) [hereinafter Hogan Memo], available at http://www.acenet.edu/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=26388&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
11. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Approves Lobbying Limits by Wide Margin, N.Y. TIMES,
available at Mar. 30, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/30/politics/30lobby.html#.
12. The Senate and House of Representatives both attempted to pass legislation to enforce
more rigorous regulation of lobbying laws. H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (as passed by House of
Representatives, Jan. 4, 2007); S. 1, 110th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Jan. 18, 2007); H.R. 2316,
110th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, May 24, 2007). Congress eventually passed
the Senate's version of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007. See Pub. L.
No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
13. See, e.g., Tony Perry, Rep. Cunningham Pleads Guilty to Bribery, Resigns, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2005, at Al, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/nov/29/local/me-duke29.
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about bribery.' 4 He helped a defense contractor, Mitchell Wade, secure
defense and intelligence contracts in exchange for gifts, including
payments for his San Diego house, the use of a Washington yacht, jewelry,
furniture, and cash.' 5  It brought to light the ability of an individual
congressman to pressure the military into accepting contracts of dubious
merit and the creative, covert ways that gifts could be arranged for
Members of Congress by those who wanted favors.' 
6
Jack Abramoff, a Republican lobbyist with the firms of Preston Gates
and Ellis and then Greenberg Traurig, was convicted of conspiracy to bribe
public officials, tax evasion, and fraud. 7 But because his web of
connections was much more extensive, his illicit dealings bought down a
number of others, including a member of Congress (Bob Ney, R-Ohio),
former Hill staff (Tony Rudy, Michael Scanlon, William Heaton, Neil
Volz, and Mark Zachares) and several Bush Administration officials
(James Steven Griles, David Safavian, and Roger Stillwell).' 8
By comparison to the Cunningham case, Abramoff s exposed many
more flaws in Washington's lobbying system. While important aspects of
the case involved bribery (e.g., Representative Bob Ney placing statements
in the Congressional record and introducing legislation on behalf of
Abramoff's clients in exchange for gifts and trips), Abramoff's highly
successful lobbying techniques-bestowing lavish gifts on Members,
administration officials and high-level staff (e.g., free golfing trips to
Scotland and meals at his expensive downtown restaurant, Signatures) in
order to achieve influence over both legislative and executive decisions,
hiring staff off the Hill (e.g., former staff to Bob Ney, Tom Delay, John
Doolittle, and Harry Reid), hiding lobbying funds through seemingly non-
political non-profits (ranging from the Capitol Athletic Club to fiscal
conservative and religious organizations), and perpetrating fraud on his
clients (double charging, padding, and lying to clients such as the Indian
tribes)-raised serious concerns about the corrupting influence lobbyists
seemed to have over Congress and White House. 19 Many lobbyists were
quick to characterize Abramoff as a rogue outlier, but friends like
Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.) suggested otherwise, saying,
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See, e.g., Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, The Fast Rise and Steep Fall of James
Abramoff WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/28/AR2005122801588.html.
18. See id.
19. See id.
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"Words like bribery are being used to describe things that happened every
day in Washington and are not bribes.
20
The initial reforms stalled under the Republican leadership, but when
the Democrats took control of the House and Senate after the 2006 mid-
term elections, the leadership was finally able to get lobbying reforms
passed. 2' As we review the bills, which differ somewhat in the two Houses
of Congress, we will point how they relate to issues raised by the scandals,
but also what is missing from the reforms.
The new Senate and House rules vary in some details, but cover the
same general areas: bans and restrictions of gifts and travel; more
limitations on the revolving door in and out of office; enhanced disclosure;
22regulations around earmarks; and, new campaign finance regulations.
Neither house opted for an independent agency to monitor and enforce
lobbying and ethics regulations, relying instead on ethics training
(mandatory in the Senate but not in the House of Representatives) and their
Ethics Committees.23 However, the Senate provides for annual audits of
the lobbyist reports by the Comptroller General.24
There were already enough provisions in the existing law to prosecute
those who blatantly violated the bribery laws (e.g., Abramoff,
Cunningham, Ney).25 The new rules went further down the regulatory path
in the sense that they applied a conflict-of-interest framework to lobbying
related activities by prohibiting or limiting actions that might induce
corrupt actions or that might have the appearance of doing so. 26 This is
especially true of the gift bans, travel restrictions, and revolving door
27provisions.
Even though it is possible that many gifts were given to Members
without the intent to corrupt and were of insufficient value to truly
persuade a Member to trade official action for a gift, both Houses, reacting
to the public reaction to Abramoff's gifting practices, chose to ban all gifts
to members and staff from lobbyists and "entities that retain lobbyists. ' 28
Similarly both the Senate and House regulations now treat travel as
something of private value that might influence or appear to influence
20. See id.
21. See Hogan Memo, supra note 10.
22. See generally id.
23. See generally id.
24. Id. at 7-9.
25. See Perry, supra note 13; Schmidt, supra note 17.
26. See generally Hogan Memo, supra note 10.
27. See generally id.
28. See id. at 10.
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Members and their staff: hence, the ban on privately funded trips,
organized or attended by lobbyists, the change to charter reimbursement
rates for corporate jets, and the requirement that members certify with the
Ethics Committee in advance that their proposed trips adhere to the rules.29
Also borrowed from the conflict-of-interest framework are the new
restrictions on revolving door arrangements between private entities and
Congressional Members and staff.30 The previous law allowed for a one
year cooling-off period for former Members before they could lobby the
legislative branch and prohibited senior staff from lobbying their former
office or committee. 31 The Senate extended the lobbying moratorium to
two years for both Members and senior staff, and prohibited family
members from lobbying the Member's staff (with the exception of those
who were lobbyists prior to the Member's election).32 The Senate rules
also prohibit members from negotiating jobs as lobbyists until their
successors are elected, and eliminated floor, gym, and parking privileges
for former Senators.33 Both the House and Senate prohibit Members from
influencing the hiring decisions of private entities, and require that
Members and senior staff disclose any negotiations for future private-sector
employment.34 The House rules also cover so called reverse revolving door
situations (i.e., lobbyists coming into government), prohibiting staff who
had been lobbyists from contacting their previous employers or clients for
one year after leaving those positions.35
Following in the path of earlier lobby reforms, the new regulations
rely very heavily on disclosure.36 They increase the financial penalties for
non-compliance to six-figures, and the number of reports (which have to
available on the internet) from semi-annual to quarterly.37 Both Houses
also require that lobbyists disclose any previous legislative or executive
experience.38 The Senate now demands disclosure of any organizations
other than the client that participates in any way in the planning,
supervising and control of lobbying activities. 39 Earmarks must now be
29. See id. at 2-9.
30. See id.
31. Seeid. at7-10.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 2-9.
35. See id. at 2-7.
36. See generally id.
37. See generally id.
38. See generally id.
39. Seeidat 7-10.
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disclosed.40 There are new disclosure rules with respect to contributions:
they must report individual and bundled contributions to Members, federal
candidates, leadership Political Action Committees ("PACs") or political
parties that exceed specified dollar amounts ($200 in the Senate and $5000
in the House) on a quarterly basis. 41  Similarly, they must disclose
contributions and reimbursements to Members for events in their honor.42
Characterizing the new lobbying rules more generally, it is fair to say
that they mostly address conflict-of-interest and corruption concerns that
arise with the non-speech aspects of lobbying such as trips, gifts and jobs.
They are clearly aimed at the most traditionally defined corrupt aspects the
Abramoff and Cunningham scandals. But can lobbying reforms go any
further, and, if so, on what basis?
II. The Corruption Paradigm
As a regulatory problem, there are important similarities between
campaign finance and lobbying reform. Partly, this is because lobbying
often involves campaign finance issues such as bundling, disclosure, and
contribution limits. But there are more fundamental similarities between
the two, independent of their intersection. First, both involve
constitutionally protected fundamental rights. However unpopular
lobbying may be to the American public, it cannot be prohibited.
Secondly, as with campaign finance, there are pure and impure speech
components to lobbying. Buying lunch or hosting a reception for a
Member does not directly communicate a message. But, lobbyists will
argue, it can create a setting in which messages are conveyed and perhaps
are more favorably received. Thirdly, as with campaign contributions and
expenditures, the strongest rationale for restricting the fundamental right to
petition the government is reducing corruption.
Bribery and conflict-of-interest are the dominant corruption
frameworks. Both treat the non-speech aspects of lobbying-gifts,
reimbursements, meals, and so on-as items of potential personal value
that might be given with the intent or appearance of influencing the
performance of official duties. Bribery statutes are aimed at intentional
quid pro quo exchanges of items of personal value for official action.
Conflict-of-interest restrictions are prophylactic measures meant to prevent
situations that enable bribery and personal enrichment. The application of
both to campaign finance, when the money can only be used for legitimate
campaign expenses, equates office-holding with personal value, a
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
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viewpoint that is controversial for some scholars. The application to
lobbying is more straightforward in the sense that gifts, honoraria,
reimbursements, golfing outings, and the like are more clearly items of
personal consumption.
Even so, as with contribution limits, it is not easy to define when a
contribution or a gift is large enough to influence a Member's actions.
Does a reception with finger food and white wine rise to a level of value
that might corrupt as compared to a sit-down dinner at an expensive
restaurant like Signatures, Jack Abramoff's establishment? Does a two-
year ban on lobbying diminish a Member's value enough to prevent
corrupting motives as opposed to a one year ban? It is problematic to
reasonably define what is or is not corrupt behavior with regard to
lobbying. If it is defined broadly to include almost anything that might
give pleasure or have positive utility for a Member, the definition runs of
the risk of being overinclusive (i.e., infringing on the right to petition and
the effectiveness of Members). Whereas, if corrupt behavior is defined too
narrowly, it would be easily evaded by those it was designed to ensnare.
The conundrum arises at both ends of the bribery equation: not only is
it hard to say what is of sufficient value to influence a Member, but it is
also hard to pin down what kinds of official action need to be prohibited.
The easiest cases are specific pieces of particularized legislation,
earmarked money, and regulatory interventions that confer benefits on an
individual, company, or organization, particularly in close temporal
proximity to a documented gift. This was what landed Representatives
Cunningham and Ney in prison in the recent wave of scandals. 43 But few
gifts come with such an indisputably related payoff. And few, if any,
lobbyists rely on gifts to sway lawmakers. 4 Rather, groups and institutions
seeking to influence policymakers rely on a broad range of tactics, some of
which they must disclose and many more of which they do not have to
disclose, some of which may strike a reasonable man as corrupt (most
notably, campaign contributions and others which may seem perfectly
reasonable; for example, simply providing information).45
For the purposes of this discussion, we will focus on three main
sources of purported influence: money, relationships, and information.
Reformers have devoted the most attention to Money and Relationships.
Political scientists have devoted the most attention to Money and
43. See Perry, supra note 13.
44. See generally Nick Allard, Lobbying Is an Honorable Profession: The Right to Petition
and the Competition to be Right, 19 STAN. L. & POL'Y. REV. 23 (2008).
45. See infra Parts II & III.
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Information.46 Most lobbyists rely on all three sources of influence. Used
effectively, all three sources of influence work in tandem.
A. Money: What Does it Buy?
Campaign money comes in several forms. Most money is in the form
of individual donations, which are capped at $2,300 per candidate per
election (the primary and general count as separate elections).47 But a
significant amount of money also comes in the form of PAC contributions,
which are capped at $5,000 per candidate per election. 8 Prior to the
McCain-Feingold Act, individuals and organizations were able to donate
unlimited "soft money" to political parties.49  Now individuals and
organizations use so-called 527s to devote unlimited sums of money to
"independent expenditures" in support of campaigns.5°
Many lobbyists and company executives give individually to
campaigns. 51  They also may organize fundraising events or help to
"bundle" donations to help candidates.52 This is one possible source of
influence. Most companies, associations, and unions active in politics also
maintain PACs, to which employees and members make individual
46. For information regarding Money, see generally Steven Ansolabehere et al., Why is
There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 105 (2003); Richard A. Smith,
Interest Group Influence in the US. Congress, 89 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 20 (1995); FRANK R.
BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN POLITICS
AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 130-33 (1998). And for sources regarding information, see generally
JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND
INFLUENCE (1995); KEVIN ESTERLING, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EXPERTISE (2004); Scott
Ainsworth, Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence 55 J. POL. 41 (1993).
47. Contributions Limits Chart 2007-2008, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/
contriblimits.shtmi (last visited Sept. 30, 2008); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (2007); 11 C.F.R.
§ 110.1 (2007). Contribution limits are increased every odd year to reflect inflation. 2 U.S.C.
§ 441 a(c) (2007).
48. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (2002).
49. See, e.g., WASHINGTONPOST.COM, CAMPAIGN FINANCE SPECIAL REPORT, SOFT
MONEY-A LOOK AT THE LOOPHOLE (1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/campfi/ intro4.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
50. See Silent Partners - The Center for Public Integrity, 527s in 2004 Shatter Previous
Records for Political Fundraising, Dec. 16, 2004, http://projects.publicintegrity.org/527/
report.aspx?aid=435 (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
51. PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE BANKROLLERS: LOBBYISTS' PAYMENTS TO THE LAWMAKERS
THEY COURT 1998-2006 (2006), available at http://ww.citizenorg/docunents/BankrollersFinal.pdf.
52. See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, NUMBER OF LOBBYIST-FUNDRAISERS FOR PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATES ALREADY EXCEEDS 2004 TOTALS (2008), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/LobbyistsFinal.pdf.
Fall 2008] ACCESS AND LOBBYING
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
donations. The manager of the PAC then decides which campaigns to
contribute to.
53
A good deal of political science research has focused on the effects of
PAC contributions on Member behavior.54 The general consensus seems to
be that while there is no neat one-to-one correlation between contribution
and votes, money does seem to help with gaining access. 55 But we can go
into a little more detail.
1. Votes for Sale?
It is not uncommon to come across claims, such as this one from the
reform group, Public Campaign, that "[t]he role of big money in American
politics should make the most cynical lawmaker blush and the average
citizen furious .... Our democracy is sinking in a cauldron of systematic
influence peddling, flagrant abuse of loopholes and political favors granted
to wealthy special interests. 56
Because campaigns are privately financed, candidates who want to be
reelected must constantly raise money. Critics of electoral fundraising
point out that the expense of running a competitive electoral campaign
results in a pool of candidates biased toward wealthy interests by the
exigencies of fundraising, regardless of whether legislators are willing to
sell their votes or lobbyists wish to buy them. The ability to acquire access
in this way fuels the widespread belief that campaign contributions buy
votes.57
Certainly, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that legislators do
sometimes tailor policies to respond to the demands of contributors,58 and
that lobbyists believe that campaign contributions influence policy. 59 But
53. See generally LARRY J. SABATO, PAC POWER: INSIDE THE WORLD OF POLITICAL
ACTION COMMITTEES (1984).
54. See generally Steven Ansolabehere et al., supra note 46.
55. Id.
56. PUBLIC CAMPAIGN, CLEAN MONEY CAMPAIGN REFORM 6 (2002), available at
http://library.publicampaign.org/sites/default/files/CleanMoneyCampaignReform.pdf.
57. Jeffrey Milyo, Money Walks: Why Campaign Contributions Aren't as Corrupting as You
Think, REASON, July 1997, available at www.reason.com/news/show/30323.html.
58. See generally Burdett A. Loomis, Does K Street Run Through Capitol Hill? Lobbying
Congress in the Republican Era, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 412 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A.
Loomis eds., 7th ed. 2006). See also Mont. Right to Life Ass'n v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085,
1093 (9th Cir. 2003).
59. One example is the internal tobacco industry memo analyzing congressional votes on the
1987 airline smoking ban, noting that legislative recipients of PAC contributions who had not
supported the industry on the bill were "targets of opportunity for issues of greater importance"
because they had "violated a trust" by failing to vote for the industry's interests. Memorandum
from S.B. Bull of Phillip Morris on Durbin Amendment (July 15, 1987) (on file with the
University of California, San Francisco, Legacy Tobacco Documents Library). See generally
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quantitative political science studies linking PAC contributions and voting
behavior are more mixed. And a substantial number conclude that
legislators are unlikely to change their votes because of campaign
contributions.
60
Such studies, however, are bedeviled by econometric problems. One
reason why it is hard to show an effect is because interest groups most
often make contributions to legislators who already support their interests,
either because these groups are part of the legislator's constituency or
because they share ideological goals. 6 1 As a consequence, we should
expect a strong correlation between the two even if contributions do not
drive voting behavior.
Another confounding factor is that lobbyists are often seeking
something other than votes. For example, such actions as getting Members
or staff to persuade colleagues, altering the wording of potential legislation,
or keeping bills out of committee hearings or off the floor may be far more
valuable, even if they are harder to measure.62
Paul R. Brewer & Christopher J. Deering, Musical Chairs: Interest Groups, Campaign
Fundraising and Selection of House Committee Chairs, in THE INTEREST GROUP CONNECTION:
ELECTIONEERING, LOBBYING, AND POLICYMAKING IN WASHINGTON 141,141 (Paul S. Herrnson
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter INTEREST GROUP CONNECTION].
60. A variety of popular economic theories view politics as a market where lawmakers sell
policy outcomes in exchange for campaign contributions. Though there are various models in the
literature, the basic assumptions predict something like quid quo pro bribery. See generally GENE
M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS (2001); Gene M. Grossman
& Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 833 (1994). Empirical studies,
however, have not been able to establish any consistent correlation between campaign
contributions and political outcomes. See generally BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 46;
Smith, supra note 46, at 139.
After examining almost forty scholarly articles attempting to find the correlation between
money and politics between 1976 and 2002, Ansolabehere et al. conclude that "[o]verall, PAC
contributions show relatively few effects on voting behavior. In three out of four instances,
campaign contributions had no statistically significant effects on legislation or had the 'wrong'
sign-suggesting that more contributions lead to less support." Ansolabehere et al., supra note
46, at 130. Similarly, Baumgartner and Leech note that "[t]he unavoidable conclusion is that
PACs and direct lobbying sometimes strongly influence Congressional voting, sometimes have
marginal influence, and sometimes fail to exert influence." BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note
46, at 134.
61. See generally David Austen-Smith & John R. Wright, Counteractive Lobbying, 38 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 25 (1994) [hereinafter Counteractive Lobbying]; David Austen-Smith & John R.
Wright, Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 543 (1996)
[hereinafter Theory and Evidence]; John R. Wright, PAC Contributions, Lobbying, and
Representation, 51 J. POL. 713 (1989); Frank R. Baumgartner & Beth L. Leech, The Multiple
Ambiguities of "Counteractive Lobbying, " 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 521 (1996).
62. See generally Marie Hojnacki & David C. Kimball, Organized Interests and the
Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 775 (1998); John R. Wright,
PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 400
(1985); Janet M. Grenzke, PACs and the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is Complex,
33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1 (1989); Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed
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In sum, the evidence for a consistent one-to-one relationship between
PAC contributions and vote outcomes is mixed at best. However, even if
the relationship is not consistently statistically significant, that does not
mean it is inconsequential. Money may not always make a difference, or
even make a difference in the majority of the cases. But the fact that there
are certain times where it appears to make a difference should still give us
pause.
2. Access for Sale?
There is much more consensus both among political scientists and
Washingtonians that money buys access. Nearly all research that relies on
interviews with interest groups and lobbyists finds that contributors use
money in the hope of gaining or maintaining access to legislators.63 In
general both legislators and interest groups accept the idea that money buys
access,6 and find the exchange unremarkable and relatively inoffensive.65
One lobbyist described his company's PAC as follows: "It's incredibly
important. It gives you credibility and lets people know you're serious
about what Washington is and about the political process and it gets you
phone calls from people who would not necessarily ever care about who
you are or what you did.",
66
Some researchers have found that lobbyists and PAC staff work
together closely, and that contribution decisions are centralized under the
Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797
(1990).
63. See generally Laura I. Langbein, Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence, 48 J.
POL. 1052 (1986); James F. Herndon, Access, Record, and Competition as Influences on Interest
Group Contributions to Congressional Campaigns, 44 J. POL. 996 (1982).
64. See generally Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Interest Group Competition
and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political
Action Committees, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1163 (1998); Nolan McCarty & Lawrence S.
Rothenburg, The Time to Give: PAC Motivations and Electoral Timing, 16 POL. ANALYSIS 239
(2000); John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 591
(2005); Hall & Wayman, supra note 62; Jeffrey Milyo et al., Corporate PAC Contributions in
Perspective, 2 BUS. & POL. 75 (2000).
65. See generally David Austen-Smith, Campaign Contributions and Access, 89 AM. POL.
ScL REv. 566 (1995); ALAN ROSENTHAL ET AL., REPUBLIC ON TRIAL: THE CASE FOR
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (Karl T. Kurtz ed., 2002); Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C.
Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 89 (1986); Theory and Evidence, supra note 61; Kevin B. Grier & Michael C.
Munger, Comparing Interest Group PAC Contributions to House and Senate Incumbents, 1980-
1986, 55 J. POL 625 (1993); Micky Tripathi et al., Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked?
New Evidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act, 4 BUS. & POL. 1 (2002).
66. Confidential Interview by author Lee Drutman.
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control of interest group lobbyists.67  These studies find that lobbyists'
favorite way to gain the access to is by making campaign contributions,68
that the majority of campaign contributions are given at lobbyist
fundraising events,69 and that lobbyists are viewed as effective when they
are good fundraisers.7 °
These researchers note that lobbyists have become major campaign
fundraisers, in some cases actually directing candidate fundraising,71 and
that when former staffers become lobbyists, they openly offer to sell access
72to legislators in return for contributions. One lobbyist summarized his
role in the political process by saying, "I raise money and I give money.,
73
Members of Congress solicit lobbyists for campaign money often,74
knowing that lobbyists will respond to these solicitations rather than risk
losing access to legislators. 75  Business PACs, in particular, direct their
campaign contributions to incumbents in order to gain access for their
lobbyists.76
Watchdog groups have also documented and lamented the role of
lobbyists as fundraisers and contributors. According to Public Citizen,
"Lobbyists and the political action committees of their firms have
contributed at least $103.1 million to members of Congress since 1998 ....
Lobbyists play a far more significant role in funding lawmakers'
campaigns by coordinating fundraisers and arranging for contributions
67. MARK J. ROZELL ET AL., INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN CAMPAIGNS: THE NEW FACE
OF ELECTIONEERING 196 (2d ed. 2006); Charles W. Hucker, Organized Labor Takes a Hard
Look at Whom It Will Support This Fall, 1978 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 193, 193-98; Michael J.
Malbin, Campaign Financing and the "Special Interests, " 56 PUB. INT. 21, 21-42 (1979);
RICHARD M. SKINNER, MORE THAN MONEY: INTEREST GROUP ACTION IN CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS 207 (2007).
68. WILLIAM P. BROWNE, GROUPS, INTERESTS, AND U.S. PUBLIC POLICY 276 (1998).
69. See generally Richard J. Semiatin & Mark J. Rozell, Interest Groups in Congressional
Elections, in INTEREST GROUP CONNECTION, supra note 59.
70. WILLIAM P. BROWNE, PRIVATE INTERESTS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND AMERICAN
AGRICULTURE 294 (1988).
71. See generally Marian Currinder et al., Interest Group Money in Elections, in INTEREST
GROUP POLITICS 182 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 7th ed. 2006).
72. See Loomis, supra note 58.
73. Joseph White, Making Connections to the Appropriations Process, in INTEREST GROUP
CONNECTION, supra note 59.
74. See Currinder et al., supra note 71.
75. BROWNE, supra note 70; White, supra note 73.
76. See generally Janet M. Grenzke, supra note 62; Langbein, supra note 63; LARRY
SABATO, PAC POWER: INSIDE THE WORLD OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES (1984); FRANK
J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES (1992); John R. Wright,
Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the US. House of Representatives, 84 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 417 (1990).
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from others."77  And according to the Center for Public Integrity,
"Lobbyists have served as treasurers for at least 800 political action
committees and 68 campaign committees in the past six years, according
the Center's study. In that time these committees have spent more than
$525 million to influence the political process. 78
Critics of this widespread practice characterize it as buying the time
and votes of legislators, or even sometimes as "paying to play." They
worry that the consequence is that non-contributors will have less access,
and that this may result in lopsided discussions of alternatives. Even the
Court has expressed some concern about the idea that large contributions
buy preferential access.79
Shortly, we will examine the case for bias and the potential
consequences of this bias. But for now, let is temporarily conclude, along
with most political scientists and Washingtonians, that if money buys
anything, it is access. And while access is not a guarantee of anything, it is
not entirely a neutral commodity.
It is easy to see the possibilities with regard to the new lobbying
regulations. While the new regulations ban gifts, lavish receptions and
trips, the effect will likely be to shift more lobbying activities into
fundraising dinners and receptions. Donations, fundraising events, and
bundling could become even more important, substituting for the now
prohibited gifts and trips as the items of value that earn access and
consideration.
It might be possible to plug this hole by lessening the lobbyists' role in
fundraising, relying perhaps on the type of targeted regulations the court
has permitted in the past for corporations and trade unions. By this logic,
because the state has given corporations advantages with respect to
aggregating wealth and because the consent of economic investors might
not extend to political contributions, future reforms might seek to separate
registered lobbyists from running campaigns, being in charge of PACs, or
even bundling money. However, even if these actions were
constitutionally permissible, it will not likely diminish the influence that
contributions have in acquiring access. The Member would likely still link
the lobbyist for Citibank with its PAC activities even if the lobbyist did not
control the PAC him or herself. This is analogous to the rise of
77. PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE BANKROLLERS: LOBBYISTS' PAYMENTS TO THE LAWMAKERS
THEY COURT, 1998-2006 (2006), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Bankrollers
Final.pdf (last visited Sept. Oct. 4, 2008).
78. Elizabeth Brown & Shaylyn Cochran, PAC-Men Lobbyists: Almost 80 Members of Congress
Used Corporate Lobbyists to Head Their Fund-raising Committees, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC
INTEGRITY, Oct. 3, 2005, http://projects.publicintegrity.org/lobby/report.aspx?aid=750.
79. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 156 (2003).
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"independent" nonprofit organizations circumventing the limits and bans
on PACs, individuals, and the parties.
However, even if private money were banned entirely from
campaigns, lobbyists would have other sources of access and potential
influence. We now turn to two of those.
B. Relationships: Do Personal Connections Matter?
When Trent Lott announced his sudden retirement in December 2007,
it caused a mini-stir. 80 Editorialists and opinion leaders fulminated at the
fact that Lott would go cash in on his public service and become a lobbyist,
right before the ban on lobbying after leaving the Senate was to increase
from one to two years. But the fact that everyone knew that Lott would
make millions as a private lobbyist highlights a simple point: relationships
matter in politics. And somebody who has both served as a former Senator
majority leader and who is known for bipartisanship has relationships that
many outside groups would find very valuable.
Lott is far from the only individual to make the transition from
government to lobbying. According the Center for Public Integrity, "More
than 2,200 former federal government employees registered as federal
lobbyists between 1998 and 2004, according to a study of federal records
by the Center for Public Integrity. Altogether, records show, more than 12
percent of current lobbyists are former executive and legislative branch
employees. This includes more than 200 former members of Congress
(175 from the House, 34 from the Senate) and 42 former agency heads." 8'
Anecdotal evidence suggests that more and more members of
Congress are becoming lobbyists upon retirement, but there have been no
quantitative historical studies of the phenomenon. Anecdotal evidence also
suggests the transition from Hill staffer to lobbyist is happening faster,
82
but again, there have been no good quantitative studies to document this.
Of course, a background in the government has always been valuable for
lobbyists. Schlozman and Tierney's survey found that 86 percent of
organizations in Washington had at least one professional with federal
government experience, though that percentage was slightly higher for
80. See, e.g., Adam Nossiter & David M. Herszenhom, Mississippi's Lott to Leave Senate
Seat, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/27/washington/
27lott.html.
81. Brown & Cochran, supra note 78.
82. One experienced lobbyist said, "Now you have people coming off the Hill with 1 or 2
years of experience asking for six-figure salaries. It's just mind-boggling." Another said, "Ten
years ago, You had folks who stayed in gov't longer. Now you have a situation where anybody
can go to capitol hill for 2 years, 3 years, come out, and make a decent living. That's one thing
you're seeing, compared to ten years ago, people have less experience." Confidential Interview
by author Lee Drutman.
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corporations and trade associations (90 percent and 97 percent,
respectively) than for unions and citizens groups (65 percent and 82
percent, respectively).83
But it is also worth noting there are plenty of successful lobbyists who
did not work for the government prior to becoming lobbyists. Does this
make their relationships any less valuable? Many lobbyists have been
working in Washington for years and are quite skilled at building personal
relationships. Many of them also have acted as fundraisers, as described
above, which is also a good way to solidify relationships.
In general, it may be worth stating the obvious: people are more
likely to take phone calls from people they know and trust than from
strangers. Pick the website of any lobbying firm, and you will find the firm
advertising an extensive network of connections and relationships. In a
town in which lawmakers and staffers are besieged by requests, it always
helps to know somebody, or know somebody who knows somebody.
Political science, unfortunately, does not have much to say about the
role of relationships in politics. At best, one large-scale network analysis
of lobbying communities in four different sectors has shown that there are
different patterns of communication. But network analysis does not offer
easy ways of delineating influence.84
Reformers have devoted more attention than political scientists to the
so-called "revolving door.",85 A recent report by The Revolving Door
Working Group listed several reasons why the constant flow of individuals
from government to the private sector and then sometimes back might be
seen as troubling.86 Among them: "It can provide a vehicle for public
servants to use their office for personal or private gain;" "[t]he revolving
door casts grave doubts on the integrity of official actions and legislation;"
and "[tihe appearance of impropriety exacerbates public distrust in
government.,
87
In sum, it seems reasonable to conclude that personal relationships
matter as a way of gaining access, though how much they matter is unclear.
Reformers care about the revolving door, in part because they think it gives
83. KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 448 (1986).
84. JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., THE HOLLOW CORE: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICY
MAKING 450 (1993).
85. See REVOLVING DOOR WORKING GROUP, A MATTER OF TRUST: HOW THE REVOLVING
DOOR UNDERMINES PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT-AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT
(2005), http://www.revolvingdoor.info/docs/matter-of-trust-final-executivesummary.pdf (last
visited Oct. 4, 2008).
86. See id.
87. See id.
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unfair advantages to certain groups as opposed to others in gaining an
audience, in part because it may encourage key decision makers to look
favorably upon future employees, and in part because allowing public
servants to cash out on their experience and connections looks unseemly.
C. Information: Is Knowledge Power?
In contrast to relationships, the role of information is a subject that
political scientists have devoted significant attention to, while reformers
have largely ignored the subject. Many studies have concluded that
information is lobbyists' most important asset 88 and perhaps their most
important function.89
The importance of information springs from the fact the members of
Congress are generalists and so, generally, are their staffs. 90 When it
comes to working on specific issues, they often need to get up to speed
quickly on particular subject matters; most lobbyists are only too happy to
help.91 Indeed, many lobbyists describe their primary role as educators. As
one lobbyist for a high-tech company explained, "Congress, they want to
make things better. But they don't understand how the things work, and so
you spend a lot of time educating them on how actual technology works. 92
Part of the information that lobbyists may be able to provide is
technical in nature. For example, if a member of Congress is looking to
write legislation to deal with cybercrime, he or she may find it helpful to
consult with software and internet companies that have specialized
knowledge into what may or may not be effective in combating
cybercrime. Lobbyists also may have particular knowledge about the
electoral consequences of taking a particular position by being in touch
with certain constituents, and may be able to derive a certain amount of
influence from being able to communicate the electoral consequences of
various actions to members. 93 Additionally, because lobbyists are often
88. Lester W. Milbrath, Lobbyists Approach Government, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN
AMERICA 374 (Robert H. Salisbury ed. 1970); Rogan Kersh, The Well-Informed Lobbyist:
Information and Interest Group Lobbying, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 389 (Allan J. Cigler &
Burdett A. Loomis eds. 2007); JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING,
CONTRIBUTIONS, AND INFLUENCE 214 (1995).
89. See generally JOHN MARK HANSEN, GAINING ACCESS: CONGRESS AND THE FARM
LOBBY 1919-1981 (1991); Milbrath, supra note 87; Wright, supra note 87; SCHLOZMAN &
TIERNEY, supra note 83; DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951); JEFFREY
M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY (1989). See also KEVIN M. ESTERLING, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EXPERTISE 286 (2004).
90. t
91. t
92. t
93. See generally HANSEN, supra note 89.
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communicating with both branches of the government and both Houses of
Congress, they can also sometimes provide information to lawmakers about
what is going on in other parts of government.
94
In general, political scientists who study the role of information in
lobbying seem mostly sanguine about the consequences. They find that
lobbyists cannot afford to misrepresent evidence because they know that
their reputation for honesty is their most precious asset.95 As a result,
lobbyists often act as "information service bureaus" for policymakers,
serving in effect as an extension of research staff.96 And even if lobbyists
do at times exaggerate their claims, policymakers and staff are generally
capable of filtering attempts to deceive them.97
Yet, there is a difference between accurate and impartial information.
While reputational risks may keep lobbyists from out and out fibbing, it
would be surprising to find lobbyists who do not present the facts in such a
way that helps them to advocate for a particular position above others.
They may emphasize certain facts over other, or they may encourage
lawmakers to think about particular issues using particular frames and
metaphors that favor their position. Some would even suggest that there
are no such things as neutral facts in the first place.98
94. One lobbyist puts it this way: "Different parts of the government don't talk to each
other. The House and Senate don't talk. They don't know what's going on in agencies. They
don't know the inner workings. We tell them what's going on in the agency, in the Senate.
That's the one thing they ask us for the most." Confidential Interview by author Lee Drutman.
95. See generally SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 83; BERRY, supra note 89; INTEREST
GROUP POLITICS IN THE SOUTHERN STATES (Ronald J. Hrebenar & Clive S. Thomas eds., 1992);
Hojnacki & Kimball, supra note 62; KEN KOLLMAN, OUTSIDE LOBBYING: PUBLIC OPINION AND
INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES 215 (1998); DAVID WHITEMAN, COMMUNICATION IN CONGRESS:
MEMBERS, STAFF, AND THE SEARCH FOR INFORMATION (1995).
96. See generally RAYMOND BAUER ET AL., AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY:
THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN TRADE (Atherton 1963); SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 83;
BERRY, supra note 89; DAVID WHITEMAN, supra note 95; HEDRICK SMITH, THE POWER GAME:
How WASHINGTON WORKS (Random House 1988); Jan Potters & Frans Van Winden, Lobbying
and Asymmetric Information, 74 PUB. CHOICE 269 (1992); LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER, How
ORGANIZATIONS ARE REPRESENTED IN WASHINGTON (Bobbs Merrill Co., Inc. 1969).
97. See generally Carol Bodensteiner, Special Interest Group Coalitions: Ethical Standards
for Broad-Based Support Efforts, 23 PUB. REL. REV. 31 (1997); Randall L. Calvert, The Value of
Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice, 47 J. POL. 530 (1985); Susanne
Lohmann, A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action, 87 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 319(1993).
98. Deborah Stone argues that
[t]he rational ideal presupposes the existence of neutral facts-neutral in the sense that
they only describe the world, but do not serve anybody's interest, promote any value
judgments, or exert persuasive force beyond the weight of their correctness. Yet facts
to do not exist independent of interpretive lenses, and they come clothed in words and
numbers. Even the simple act of naming an object places it in a class and suggests it is
like some things and unlike others. Naming, like counting and rule-making, is
classification, and thus a political act.
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Moreover, it may not always be the case that legislators get to hear
from both sides of an issue and thus can triangulate between two competing
views. As Schlozman and Tierney suggest, "A policymaker who hears
from only one side--or who hears much more from one side than the
other-is likely to be persuaded by the arguments and information to which
he or she is exposed. Hence if access is unequal, it would not be surprising
if it were to have consequences for influence."
99
Consider the case of the Investment Company Institute, which
maintains a seventy-person research staff and is ready to assist Congress at
the drop of a hat. 00 As one of their lobbyists, a former congressional
staffer, puts it,
I think our research capability is something people on the hill know
about it. when I go up there, I'd say if you want to do something, call
us, we've got decades of information that I can help with .... I
think a good congressional staffer doesn't need to know everything,
but he needs to know who to call to get answers quickly.'1
0
The Investment Company Institute has the resources to maintain a
seventy-person research staff, which includes several Ph.D. economists.102
The Investment Company Institute represents the mutual fund industry.'0 3
But who represents mutual fund investors? The Consumer Federation has a
small Investor Protection department. If the Investment Company Institute
becomes the go-to resource for information for lawmakers interested in
working on legislation related to the fund industry, that is significant.
In sum, while political scientists have been able to document that
information is a source of access for lobbyists, the general consensus seems
to be that it does not do much to unduly influence lawmakers because the
importance of maintaining a reputation for honesty does not leave lobbyists
must room to dissemble. But the conclusion that this information-based
access does not distort policymaking implicitly assumes that (1)
information is neutral; (2) lawmakers are able to get good information on
multiple sides of an issue; and (3) access itself is mostly a neutral
commodity.
DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING
309 (3d ed. 2001).
99. SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 83, at 165.
100. t
101. t
102. t
103. t
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D. The Corruption Paradigm: A Mini-Summary
To what extent is lobbying "corrupt"? In part, this depends both on
how appropriate and how effective we can determine various sources of
influence to be. At one extreme, we might consider expensive personal
gifts to be corrupting. But what about providing policy or constituent-level
information? Should that in any way be seen as corrupting? What if it
actually proves to be a better means of achieving access to key decision
makers? Should potential sources of influence and access be judged based
upon how effective they are at achieving their intended goals? Or do we
think that there is something more inherently corrupting about campaign
contributions than information? If so, what is it?
Of these areas discussed, the case for limiting money certainly seems
the strongest and most feasible. How, exactly, would one go about limiting
friendships? And what possible constitutional or normative justification
could there be for limiting information?
The bigger question here, however, is whether these various sources
privilege certain groups over others. Democratic norms place the highest
value on discussions in which all sides have an equal chance to
participate.104 If certain groups are able to better take advantage of these
various sources of access and influence, it will be far from our ideals of
democratic participation. Even if the processes by which access and
influence achieved are not "corrupt" per se, they still may favor certain
groups over others, and may lead to unjust and unequal outcomes.
Let us now turn to the evidence that certain types of groups are indeed
advantaged, and consider what, if anything, we should do about it.
III. Systematic Bias
While the corruption problem is important, it does not address what
many political scientists have identified as a systemic corporate bias in the
lobbying system, which is not traditional corruption but an equity issue.
105
Every count of groups in the Washington lobbying community ever done
has confirmed a lobbying landscape dominated by businesses and business
trade associations. In their review of the literature, Baumgartner and Leech
conclude: "A consistent finding that business and profit-sector
organizations have an advantage in the process of mobilization is one of the
104. t
105. See generally ELMER ERIC SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A
REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 20 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1960); Schlozman
& Tierney, supra note 83.
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most important elements of the nature of bias in the Washington interest-
group community.
' °6
In saying that the pressure system is "biased," we do recognize that is
difficult to make any claims about what an unbiased pressure system would
look like. 10 7 But, at the very least, we have a basic notion of diffuse versus
concentrated interests. Generally, we assume that so-called public interest
groups represent diffuse interests, though we may sometimes quibble with
their approaches. 10 8 Other groups, like unions and groups that represent
particular races and ethnicities, women, or the elderly, might fall
somewhere in between, though they claim to speak for a broad swath of the
population. 10 9 But businesses are primarily concerned about their own
profitability, even though they may couch their arguments in terms of
public goods."0 Trade associations and professional associations are also
looking out for their particular members, who are concerned about
themselves."' So when we talk about a pressure system dominated by
businesses, trade associations, and professional associations, we are also
talking about a pressure system dominated by concentrated interests.
There are, of course, different ways to measure this bias. One way to is
simply to take counts of organizations who are listed as being active. The most
thorough approach to this has been conducted by Kay Schlozman and various
colleagues over the years, who have coded every organization in the
Washington Representatives Directory for the years 1981, 1991, 2001, and
2006.112 The results confirm Schattschneider's claim. 13 At all times, roughly
one-half of all the organizations listed in the directory are businesses or
business-trade associations. No other group comes close. And the natural
opponents of business-unions and public interest groups, a term which
Schlozman and colleagues defined very broadly that includes conservative as
well as liberal groups-are largely overmatched. 14  For every one public
interest group or union, there are ten groups representing business.
106. BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 46, at 111.
107. See, e.g., David Gray & Virginia Gray, Bias in the Heavenly Choir: Interests in Society
and before Government, 16 J. OF THEORETICAL POL. 5-30 (2004).
108. 1
109. 1
110. t
111. t
112. Kay Schlozman et al., Who Sings in the Heavenly Chorus? The Shape of the Organized
Interest System, paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference, (Aug.
2008), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p279447_index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
113. See generally SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 105; SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note
83.
114. Kay Schlozman et al., supra note 112.
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Comparing the Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1960 with the
Washington Representatives Directory 1981:
1960: Organizations 1980: Organizations 1980: Organizations
listed in CQ with their own DC having DC
Almanac offices representation
Corporations 16% 21% 52%
Trade/Business 41% 32% 20%
Associations
Professional 5% 15% 8%
Associations
Unions 11% 3% 2%
Citizens Groups 9% 9% 5%
Source: Schlozman & Tierney, supra note 82, at 77.
1981 Wash. Reps 1991 Wash. Reps 2001 Wash. Reps
Corporations 45.2% 33.2% 33.5%
Trade/Business 14.7% 15.0% 13.2%
Associations
Professional 4.4% 4.7% 3.8%
Associations
Unions 1.6% 1.5% 1.0%
Public Interest 3.8% 4.9% 4.7%
Health 1.3% 3.6% 4.9%
State/Local Gov't 5.1% 6.9% 10.3%
Colleges/Universities 0.5% 1.3% 2.7%
Source: Scholzman et al., supra note 111, 43.
Another measurement would be lobbying disclosure forms.
Baumgartner and Leech use this measure for 1996 and found that the
business bias is even more pronounced under this measure."'
Yet another way to think about bias is to evaluate it by policy
domain.116 This thinking informs the Hollow Core, surely the most
comprehensive study of lobbying and lobbyists ever undertaken.' 17 Heinz,
Laumann, Nelson, and Salisbury examined four policy domains and found
a different breakdown of organizational representation in each domain.
The business advantage shows through, but it definitely varies by sector.
All this highlights the fact that to discuss bias generally is only part of the
story. We also need to discuss bias in relation to specific policy domains.
115. Frank R. Baumgartner & Beth L. Leech, Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons:
Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics, 63 J. OF POL. 1119-213 (2001).
116. EDWARD 0. LAUMANN & DAVID KNOKE, THE ORGANIZATIONAL STATE: SOCIAL
CHOICE IN NATIONAL POLICY DOMAINS t (Univ. of Wis. Press 1987).
117. HEINZ ET AL., supra note 84, at t.
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Agriculture Energy Health Labor Total
Business 20 54 15 8 24
Citizen Issue 14 11 7 4 9
Group
State/Local Gov't 3 5 6 1 4
Labor Union 5 1 3 34 10
Minority Group 3 0 14 11 7
Nonprofit 1 4 21 7 8
Professional 1 3 17 4 6
Trade Association 51 22 16 26 29
Source: JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., supra note 83, at 63.
Breaking policy into specific issues, Baumgartner and Leech examined
one hundred and thirty-seven issues at random mentioned in lobby
disclosure forms.' 18 What they found was that most lobbying takes place
on a handful of bills (most of the heavily lobbied bills were appropriations
bills). But it was in the bills that attracted the least attention where
business was the most dominant. The paper does not detail the passage rate
success of the different bills. 19 But it does give us another way to think
about bias. Perhaps businesses can afford to work on a wide portfolio of
issues, including many low-profile issues on which they are the only ones
who are lobbying, whereas other resource-poor groups are only able to
work on a few high-profile, big fight issues on which they will have less
impact.
The fact that a lot of the "issues" with the most lobbying reports are
appropriations bills suggests that Baumgartner and Leech may overstate
their findings a little bit about there being a few big conflict issues, because
groups lobbying on these bills likely are only concerned with specific
provisions. So this may mask the fact that there is a lot of "niche"
lobbying. In his study of lobbying in the agricultural sector, Browne finds
that much of the lobbying is non-conflictual and oriented around particular
"niche" issues. 120 There is little evidence for this kind of politics outside
the agricultural sector, however. 121  The agricultural sector has a
remarkable diversity of specialized commodity associations that one does
not find anywhere else. 122 The business bias is even more pronounced
118. Baumgartner, supra note 61, at 1191-213.
119. Id.
120. William P. Browne, Organized Interests and their Issue Niches: A Search for Pluralism
in a Policy Domain, 52 J. OF POL. (1990).
121. t
122. The 2006 Washington Representatives Directory (Columbia Books, ed. Valerie
Sheridan), lists sixty-eight different specialty agricultural commodity trade associations ranging
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when the metric is expenditures. 123 Consider, of the twenty most active
lobbying organizations, eleven are private corporations, and eight are
business trade groups. 124 The only other group is AARP.
125
More broadly, Baumgartner and Leech after looking at lobbying data
from 1996, found that businesses alone accounted for $461 million on
lobbying expenditures-more than half (56 percent) of the $823 million
spent on lobbying that year.1 26 Together, businesses, trade associations,
and professional groups account for 85 percent of the total spending
reported. 127 Just on their own, corporations accounted for 43 percent of
registrations, 46 percent of reports filed, and 43 percent of issues
mentioned. 128  Business trade associations, meanwhile, accounted for 16
percent of registrations, 17 percent of reports filed, and 20 percent of issues
mentioned. 129 No matter how they sliced the data, citizen groups and non-
profits never accounted for more than 10 percent of the lobbying
environment, leading the authors to conclude that "the extent of business
predominance in the group system is greater than previously reported....
Not only do businesses constitute the largest category of lobbying
organizations in Washington... but they are by far the best endowed and
most active.
130
Certainly, the Washington pressure community is not a static entity.
There was a wave of public interest group mobilization in the 1960s,
followed by a wave of business mobilization in the 1970s. 131 Since 1981,
the number of groups with Washington representation has roughly doubled,
with particularly rapid growth in areas of health, education, and local
government. 132 But, as described above, the fact that most groups represent
business has remained remarkably consistent.
from the American Peanut Product Manufacturers Inc to the American Butter Institute, from the
National Institute of Oilseed Products to the National Yogurt Association. For a discussion of the
agricultural subsidies, see GUY MUCCIARIONI, REVERSALS OF FORTUNE, 107-44 (Brookings
Institution Press 1995).
123. See Baumgartner, supra note 61.
124. See http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
125. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
126. See Baumgartner, supra note 61.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 1195.
131. See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES 148-239 (Basic Books 1989).
132. Schlozman, supra note 112, at 43 (based on the work of Loomis and Cigler describing
10 of the "most substantial" developments as follows: "[a] great proliferation of interest groups
since the early 1960s"; "[a] centralization of group headquarters in Washington, DC, rather than
New York City or elsewhere"; "[m]ajor technological developments in information processing
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A. Campaign Money, Relationships and Information
In discussing the corruption paradigm, we identified three sources of
potential influence: campaign money, relationships, and information. Is
there evidence that these sources of influence are biased in one way or
another?
There is good evidence that most PAC money comes from
corporations. Consider the following macro-breakdown of PAC
contributions from the 2006 elections. More than 70 percent of the money
comes from business PACs. And business PACs outspend labor PACs by a
17-to-I ratio. Another way to think about campaign contributions is to
break it down by sector.' 33  Again, most of the sectors are mostly
business.' 34 Labor comes in eighth.135  Lawyers and lobbyists come in
fourth.
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It is also worth noting that under existing tax laws, advocacy groups
that want to maintain their tax-exempt status for charitable giving are
prohibited from participating in partisan politics, though some do set up
separate organizations in order to achieve their electoral goals.
Again, as we noted earlier, campaign contributions do not necessarily
buy policy, but they do tend to help with access. As one lobbyist put it,
"It's all about having prior relationships, which is why fundraisers are
important.... It's a lot easier working on an agenda with somebody you
helped get into office.' ' 137  At the very least, fundraisers are also an
opportunity to check in, to get "face time," and to build relationships.
As we discussed above, these relationships are another source of
influence. 3 8  If fundraisers help to establish and build relationships, and
that promote more sophisticated, more timely, and more specialized communications strategies,
such as grassroots lobbying"; "[t]he rise of single-issue groups"; "[c]hanges in campaign finance
laws (1971,1974) and the ensuing growth of political action committees (PACs), and more
recently, the growth of independent campaign expenditures by some interests"; "[t]he increased
formal penetration of political and economic interests within the bureaucracy (advisory
committees), the presidency (White House group representatives), and the Congress (caucuses of
members)"; "[t]he continuing decline of political parties' ability to perform key electoral and
policy-related activities."; "[t]he increased number, activity, and visibility of public-interest
groups, such as Common Cause and the Ralph Nader inspired public interest research
organizations."; "[t]he growth of activity and impact by institutions, including corporations,
universities, state, and local governments, and foreign interests."; "[a] continuing rise in the
amount and sophistication of group activity in state capitals, especially given the devolution of
some federal programs and substantial increases in state budgets.").
133. See infra Appendix, Table 3.
134. See http://www.opensecrets.org, (last visited Dec. 10, 2007).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Confidential interview by author Lee Drutman.
138. See supra notes 44-104 and accompanying text.
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different groups do not participate equally in fundraising, it stands to
reason that certain groups may have particular relationship advantages that
spring from their more active participation in fundraising activities.
As we discussed, lobbyists do play an active role in fundraising.
139
But Public Citizen's report on lobbyist contributions note that there are a
few lobbyists who dominate the fundraising world:
Just over 6 percent of lobbyists account for more than four-fifths of
the money lobbyists have contributed to members of Congress since
1998." And "Just 27.1 percent (7,350) of the 27,121 people who
registered as lobbyists since 1998 have contributed at least $200 to a
single congressional candidate or PAC.1
40
Additionally, "the contributions of the top 50 lobbyists are particularly
striking. Since 1998, these lobbyists have given an average of more than
$207,000 to members of Congress, or $25,890 per year." 141 The National
Journal has called these the "super donors.,
142
Given what we know, we can reasonably guess that these "super
donors" are among the most well-connected lobbyists in Washington. We
do not know what they charge for their services, but we can reasonably
guess they do not come cheap. This means that only those groups with the
most money could afford to hire them. Surely, all lobbyists are not all
equal. Some are former members of Congress or chiefs of staff who have
lots of connections, who both really understand the political process and
139. Seeid.
140. See The Bankrollers, PUBLIC CITIZEN CONGRESS WATCH (2006), http://www.citizen.
org/documents/BankrollersFinal.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
141. See id.
142. The reason the top fifty lobbyists have been designated "super donors" is as follows:
What sets... super-donors apart is that they routinely hit the maximum aggregate limit
on what an individual may donate to candidates-and political parties and political
action committees. That limit, indexed for inflation, is $108,200 in this election cycle.
Only a small slice of the K Street community can afford to give that much money, and
it is an elite and often-overlooked group. Political scientists have exhaustively studied
special-interest PAC money, and much has been made lately of so-called bundlers,
fundraisers who round up millions of dollars in donations from friends, business
associates, clients, and others to help their favorite candidates. But lobbyists who dip
generously into their personal bank accounts play a quiet yet powerful role on Capitol
Hill. An analysis done for National Journal by the Center for Responsive Politics
identified a select group of perhaps a dozen lobbyists who each double up with their
spouses to give, as a couple, a staggering $150,000 to $200,000 to candidates and
political parties per election cycle. By pairing with their spouses-some of whom are
fellow lobbyists-these top donors magnify their political giving and clout.
See Eliza Newlin Carney, Super Donnors, NAT'L J., (Dec. 2007) (center's analysis encompassed
three election cycles: the current 2008 race along with the 2006 and 2004 cycles).
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know how to make things happen.143 They generally come at a high price,
which only those with the most money can afford. 144 But these most clever
and well-connected of lobbyists may amplify the already existing bias even
more than has been documented. As one pharmaceutical lobbyist put it
bluntly, "We can generally hire the best people from capitol Hill." 141
The third area we discussed is information. 146 One way to evaluate the
possible bias is to examine participation in an area where information is
probably most important and where money and relationships are not:
agency rule-making. 147 The evidence is that business participation in this
domain is remarkably commensurate with its general share of the interest
group community.' 4  In a comprehensive survey of agency rule-making,
Susan and Jason Webb Yackee culled through all the comments for forty
rules promulgated at four agencies over a seven-year period and find that
57 percent represent business interests, 19 percent represent government
interests, and only 6 percent represent public interest group. 149 They also
show that businesses tend to get what they want generally in agency rule-
making. 150 They argue that
business influence stems from "strength in numbers" and that
business comments contain higher quality information than
comments from other kinds of rule-making participants.'15  Our
analysis demonstrates that a greater proportion of business interests
within the public comments allow business commentators to better
pursue their preferred level of government involvement in agency152
rules. This finding suggests that if other types of participants
become more active in their submission of comments, business
influence over agency policy outputs may decrease during the notice
and comment period.
143. See REVOLVING DOOR WORKING GROUP, A MATTER OF TRUST: HOW THE REVOLVING
DOOR UNDERMINES PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT-AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT,
supra note 85.
144. See id.
145. Confidential interview by author Lee Drutman.
146. See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
147. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. OF POL. 128-39 (2006).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See infra Part I1.
153. Webb & Yackee, supra note 147.
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Similarly, Scott Furlong argues,
Most often the issues that attract interest groups to the executive
branch are highly technical in nature and involve some form of
regulation of society, in particular the economic sector. As a result,
those attentive to the permanent government and its decisions in
implement public policies tend to be skewed toward those economic
interests directly affected by such decisions. 154
He concludes that "groups not dependent on large memberships and more
likely to have legal and administrative expertise lobby the executive branch
more than the public interest groups."'
155
Possibly, diffuse interest groups spend more time communicating
information at the legislative level. 156 But at the very least, it seems clear
that businesses have extensive information resources. Given the common
understanding that information is an important part of the lobbying process
and the resources that businesses spend on lobbying, it would be surprising
if they didn't spend extensively on their capacity to provide information.
To sum up, the evidence suggests that not only do businesses mobilize
at a greater rate than unions and diffuse interest groups that might
countervail their power. 5 7  They also spend more money on campaigns,
are able to hire the most connected lobbyists, and are able to provide plenty
of information.' 58 All these capacities further help them to gain access to
key decision makers.'5 9 And access, of course, is a necessary condition for
influence.
B. Why Does the Bias Exist?
Given the fact that the groups representing business have always
predominated in the pressure system, we might want to know why this is
the case, and what is it about the nature of group politics that leads to such
unequal representation. Understanding the forces that shape the balance of
154. Scott R. Furlong, Exploring Interest Group Participation in Executive Policymaking, in
INTEREST GROUP CONNECTION, supra note 59, at t.
155. Id. at 239.
156. Anecdotally, one experienced lobbyist had this to say:
One thing that amuses me is the number of organizations who don't spend any time
with executive agencies-now there is more and more activity, but still much less
activity than there should be. Typically people at the higher grades of understanding are
more active, but the legislative is easier to understand, though even that is complicated.
Confidential Interview by author Lee Drutman.
157. See supra notes 131-56 and accompanying text.
158. See id.
159. See id.
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the pressure system should better be able to help us to consider what, if
anything, can be done to make it more equitable.
The most widely accepted explanation for the bias comes from an
economist, Mancur Olson.160 Working from the starting point that people
are basically self interested, Olson elegantly demonstrated that bias would
inevitably creep into the pluralist world because those groups who would
mobilize behalf on so-called diffuse interests faced what he called a free-
rider problem. 161 Everybody wants clean air, for instance, but because
clear air is a public good and hence non-divisible, everybody would get to
breath cleaner air regardless of whether they contributed to efforts to make
the air cleaner. This creates an incentive to free ride on the efforts of
others, and ultimately undercuts the collective incentive to act.
Countering this to some degree are diffuse interest groups that form in
spite of the free-rider problem. 162 These groups exist because entrepreneurs
start them; 163 patrons fund them and governments sustain them;164 and,
members overestimate the impact of their contributions165 and get
psychological benefits of solidarity from being a part of them.166 But few
of these groups are thriving to same degree as the concentrated groups, and
as the data clearly show, they certainly do not mobilize with the same
resources that concentrated interests do.
Under Olson's framework, the predominance of business and trade
associations makes perfect sense. 167 Because these interests are narrow and
a lot is at stake for them, there are no real problems of free riding. Olson
also noted that many associations offered other selective material benefits
(such as discounted insurance or professional development), and that
politics was simply a "by-product" of the money raised in exchange for
these selective benefits. 168 As Salisbury later noted, institutions have a
particularly easy time of mobilizing, given that they already exist. 169 If
160. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (Harvard Univ.
Press 1965).
161. See generally id.
162. See infra Appendix, Tables 1 & 2.
163. Robert H. Salisbury, An Exchange Theory ofInterest Groups, 13 MIDWEST J. OF POL.
SCI. 1-32 (1969).
164. JACK L. WALKER, MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS,
PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 75-102 (Univ. of Mich. Press 1991).
165. See generally TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND
THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS (Univ. of Chi, Press 1980).
166. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (Basic Books 1974).
167. See generally OLSON, supra note 159.
168. See generally id.
169. Robert H. Salisbury, Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions, 78 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 64-76 (1984).
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Wal-Mart executives decide they want to mobilize politically on behalf of
the company, they already have the resources to divert into operating a
Washington office.
170
A number of scholars have argued that the nature of political conflict
exacerbates the bias. 171 This is because a good deal of political conflict
tends involve issues in which a lot is at stake for a particular industry or a
set of companies, but the benefit or cost to the average citizen is small,
barely noticeable, and unlikely to provoke political interest. James Q.
Wilson has argued that a good deal of political conflict involves the
combination either of diffuse costs and concentrated benefits or diffuse
benefits and concentrated costs. 172 Either way, it is extremely rare for a
diffuse interest to triumph over a concentrated interest.
A large amount of literature suggests that in policymaking, only those
directly affected by the policy (typically a regulated industry or profession)
will participate and as a result most of the public will be uninvolved.
This complexion goes by various names-sub-governments, iron triangles,
and policy whirlpools. 1
74
While such diagnoses were common prior to the 1970s, the extent to
which this is still true remains a point of debate. 75 Heclo argued that the
more diffuse "issue networks" were rapidly replacing the "iron triangles"
of old, but worried that this, too, made things less democratic because it
raised the hurdles of expertise to participate in these debates.
176
Baumgartner and Jones argue that policy communities have a tendency
towards long-term stability, but every now and then a major controversy or
170. Id.
171. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (Basic Books 1980);
THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (Norton 1979); GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE
POWER & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Knopf 1966); DOUGLASS CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON:
A CRITICAL LOOK AT TODAY'S STRUGGLE TO GOVERN IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL (Random
House 1964); MARVER H BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
(Princeton Univ. Press 1955); ERNEST STACEY GRIFFITH, THE IMPASSE OF DEMOCRACY; A
STUDY OF THE MODERN GOVERNMENT IN ACTION (Harrison-Hilton Books, Inc. 1939).
172. See generally WILSON, supra note 170.
173. See generally LOWI, supra note 170; GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER &
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Knopf 1966); DOUGLASS CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON: A
CRITICAL LOOK AT TODAY'S STRUGGLE TO GOVERN IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL (Random House
1964); MARVER H BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
(Princeton University Press 1955); ERNEST STACEY GRIFFITH, THE IMPASSE OF DEMOCRACY: A
STUDY OF THE MODERN GOVERNMENT IN ACTION (Harrison-Hilton Books, Inc. 1939).
174. See generally id.
175. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Berry, Subgovernments, Issue Networks, and Political Conflict in
REMAKING OF AMERICAN POLITICS 236-60 (Richard E. Harris and Sidney M. Milkis, eds. 1989).
176. See generally Hugh Heclo, Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, in THE
NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 282 (American Enter. Inst. 1978).
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issue re-framing shuffles the deck. 177  Browne shows that at least in
agriculture, there are an awful lot of non-conflictual niche issues. 178
Baumgartner and Leech show that on most bills, only a few organizations
are active, but on a handful of bills, hundreds are active.17
9
In sum, we can conclude that there are systemic reasons why the bias
exists. 180 For one, businesses tend to have fewer obstacles to mobilization
than diffuse interest groups.' 81 And for another, most political conflict is
structured so that the consequences of policy are highly salient to particular
concentrated interests, but not the general public. 182 Taken together, this
suggests that the imbalances in the pressure system are endemic and not
likely to change anytime soon.
C. Countering the Bias
It is worth pondering for a moment whether, even if bias exists, we
should be troubled by it. A couple of possibilities exist that might mitigate
the perceived negative consequences. One is that, as some scholars have
concluded, lobbyists are not particularly influential. 183  Another is the
Madisonian view of factions counteracting factions, which idealizes a
policy process in which groups mobilize as their interests are threatened
and hash out agreements and compromises in some roughly democratic
way.' 84 The fact that businesses mobilize more may simply be a sign that
177. See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND
INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (Univ. of Chi. Press 1993).
178. William P. Browne, Organized Interests and their Issue Niches: A Search for Pluralism
in a Policy Domain, 52 J. OF POL. 477-509 (1990).
179. WILSON, supra note 171, probably offers the most useful framework for thinking about
conflict. This framework suggests that both costs and benefits can be of two types: concentrated
or diffused, which sets up a two-by-two matrix of possible combinations. When concentrated
groups go up against diffuse groups, concentrated groups usually win, so it is worth paying
attention to the structure of politics. Most regulatory politics fall pretty clearly into the realm of
concentrated costs, diffuse benefits, which is why regulated interests tend to triumph. Similarly,
many specific entitlement programs fall into the realm of concentrated benefits, diffuse costs,
which is why they tend to thrive. Only when concentrated interests battle each other or diffuse
interests battle each other should we expect to see any real political conflict. And if most political
battles fall into the real of concentrated vs. diffuse interests, there is usually not going to be much
of a fight. The concentrated interest will always have more at stake, and hence be much more
likely to mobilize effectively. Schlozman, supra note 112, at t.
180. See infra Parts I & III.
181. See generally OLSON, supra note 160.
182. See generally WILSON, supra note 171.
183. See generally RAYMOND BAUER, ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL & LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER,
AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN TRADE (Atherton Press
1963); Lester W. Milbrath, Lobbyists Approach Government, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN
AMERICA 347-403 (Harper & Row 1970).
184. THE FEDERALISTNO. 51 (James Madison).
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they are more under threat and hence weaker. It is also possible that
businesses mostly wind up battling each other and in the end fight each
other to a standstill.
At least at mid-century, the Madisonian view prevailed in political
science. 185 But after two decades of arguing about the nature of influence
and power, scholars ultimately agreed to disagree, leaving the discipline
with nothing close to a conclusion on whether a balanced pluralism was
alive and well or whether Washington was suffering a corporate
takeover.186 In the years since, scholars have turned their attentions away
from grander theories and instead to trying to measure and quantify specific
cases of influence, producing the mixed findings described above.
187
So is the bias troublesome for democratic norms? We argue that it is.
Specific examples of influence may be hard to show and the results may be
mixed, but even if groups who try to influence policy are successful only
half of the time (a result that would fall far short of the 95 percent
confidence that scholars would need to confirm the hypothesis that some
tactic is successful).188 That is a pretty good record, given that some groups
are involved in an awful lot of attempts to influence policy outcomes.
1 89
As Heinz et al. conclude, "The general pattern is that doing more of
anything produces greater success than doing less, regardless of the
strategy." 90
We agree with Schattschneider that
[t]he size of the constituencies being mobilized, the inclusiveness or
exclusiveness of the conflicts people expect to develop have a
bearing on all theories of how politics is or should be organized. In
other words, nearly all theories of politics have something to do with
the question of who can get into the fight and who is to be
excluded.19'
185. See generally DAVID BICKELL TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL
INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (Knopf 1951); ROBERT ALAN DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?
DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (Yale Univ. Press 1967); NELSON W. POLSBY,
COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY (Yale Univ. Press 1963).
186. See generally ANDREW S. MCFARLAND, NEOPLURALISM: THE EVOLUTION OF
POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY (Kansas Univ. Press 2004).
187. See generally id.
188. See, e.g., ERIK A. HANUSHEK & JOHN E. JACKSON, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR SOCIAL
SCIENTISTS (QUANTITATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIAL RELATIONS) 45-69 (Academic Press 1977).
189. For examples of attempts to influence policy outcomes, see the database provided at
http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event choosefields, browse the lobby disclosure forms at
Senate Office of Public Disclosure website and you will see multiple organizations who report
lobbying on dozens of issues in a given year.
190. HEINZ ET AL., supra note 84, at 348.
191. See SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 105, at 20.
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If, as political scientists widely believe, systemic bias favoring
concentrated, well-funded interests is a problem, what can be done to
restore something closer to the pluralist ideal of a rough balance of power
with at best only temporary winners or losers and generous helping of
compromise? Pluralists believe that stable polities are built on fluid
coalitions across issue areas, in which winners in some realms become
losers in others, and vice versa. 92 A system in which some groups are
dominant and others permanently subordinate creates festering tensions and
the potential for more serious civil strife.
193
The challenge then is how to counter monopoly or dominance without
interfering with fundamental rights. Most regulatory approaches level
down: that is, they constrain fundamental freedoms for the sake of
preserving systemic integrity.' 94  In the area of campaign finance and
political speech, the Court has been skeptical of attempts to level down in
the interests of equity. 9 5 The one exception has been targeted regulations
aimed at the corporate form of organization, citing the advantages of the
corporate form as a reason to allow compensatory burdens.
96
For example, in upholding a federal statutes prohibits corporations
from using treasury funds to make an expenditure in connection with any
federal election, the Court has concluded that
[t]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation... are not
an indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas.
They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of
investors and customers. The availability of these resources may
make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the
power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its
ideas.
197
And in upholding a Michigan state law limiting independent political
expenditures by corporations, the Court majority wrote that
... the unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the
amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent
expenditures. Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections
when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures, just as
it can when it assumes the guise of political contributions. We
192. See generally TRUMAN, supra note 89.
193. t
194. t
195. t
196. t
197. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens For Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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therefore hold that the State has articulated a sufficiently compelling
rationale to support its restriction on independent expenditures by
corporations.199
One strategy, therefore, might be to separate the roles of the
corporate/associational lobbyist from the running and direction of the
corporate PACs. The current law allows some corporate money to
establish PACs, but, in theory, one might argue that allowing the lobbyist
to direct and organize the PAC is excessive, and that there is an important
state purpose in preventing the appearance of the quid pro quo exchange of
access and favor for campaign money. 199 To be sure, this separation would
not end the influence of the client and its PAC when the lobbyist contacts a
Member, but it does lessen the potentially corrupt appearance and weaken
the personal dependence on the lobbyists. It would also put lobbyists on a
more formally equal footing, even if not eliminating the advantages
completely.
The other half of the strategy is to level up as opposed to level down.
The original pluralist notion was that faction was inevitable, and, therefore,
faction should be used to counter faction.200 By this logic, the goal should
not be to eliminate lobbying but to increase lobbying, particular for
underrepresented and disadvantaged groups. This might mean adopting a
public defender model, with publicly-funded lobbyists for groups that can
demonstrate a sufficiently broad membership base and non-corporate
funding. The funding could be matching or complete subsidy. As we
noted, lobbyists for non-diffuse interests are very much outnumbered. 20
The incentive of having the expense underwritten for them might
encourage the formation of more membership-based, diffuse interest
groups.
The larger point is that systemic bias should not be ignored and
corrections should conform to pluralist ideals. There is room for election
law in this reform if targeted regulations of lobbyists' campaign activities
can survive constitutional scrutiny. But there should also be an
institutional component that proactively proliferates the number of
lobbyists for diffuse, membership groups.
198. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
199. See generally McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). See Fed. Elections Comm'n v. Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2000) (acknowledging that corruption
extends beyond explicit cash-for-votes agreements to undue influence on an officeholder's
judgment).
200. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
201. See supra notes 131-97 and accompanying text.
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Conclusion
The new lobbying regulations extend the disclosure and conflict-of-
interest principles to lobbying activities, and as such, are a welcome•• 202
regulatory addition. However, there are limits to how far the corruption
model can extend further without labeling much political activity as corrupt
and infringing on the effective running of government.0 3 Lobbyists serve a
legitimate constitutional function and provide valuable information and
expertise. 204 Moreover, the new regulations will likely encourage a closer
connection between fundraising and lobbying.20 5  This needs to be
addressed in the next wave of reforms.
There is bias in the pressure system.20 6 There always has been.2°7
Whether we measure it by organizations represented, by money spent, by
issues acted on, or participation in rule-making, we see that businesses and
trade associations consistently mobilize at roughly ten times the rate that
those forces that might countervail them do.208 Though public interest
groups may grab more positive media coverage and get to testify in
hearings more often, it is not clear how much difference this makes,
especially given the extent to which so much politics (particularly the
politics that concentrated interests mostly care about) happens without the
public paying attention.20 9 Certainly, the pressure system has become
much larger and open over the last four decades.210  But the business
advantage has remained remarkably consistent.2 1
And there probably always will be bias. Given the nature of politics
and policy conflict, concentrated interests have generally more reasons to
212
mobilize than diffuse interests. They also have far fewer collective-
action problems to overcome and do not face the free-rider problem nearly
as acutely as groups that would mobilize on behalf of the "public
interest.,213 Moreover, businesses and other institutions have the especial
advantage that if they want to mobilize, they do not need to go out and
202. t
203. t
204. See generally Allard, supra note 44.
205. t
206. See supra notes 105-201 and accompanying text.
207. See id.
208. This is based on calculations of campaign spending and lobbying spending, tallied at
http://www.opensecrets.org.
209. See, e.g., LOWl, supra note 171.
210. See Schlozman et al., supra note 112.
211. See id.
212. See supra notes 105-201 and accompanying text.
213. See generally OLSON, supra note 160.
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form a group.214 They simply hire Washington representation out of their
general treasury.
215
As to the extent to which this bias is troublesome, it depends in part on
one's normative framework. Certainly, it is difficult to say what an
unbiased pressure system looks like. And certainly, influence is a difficult
thing to measure conclusively. But it strains credulity to argue that these
groups have no influence on politics. True, as political scientists are fond
of noting, there may not be a neat one-to-one ratio between campaign
contributions and political votes. 2 16 But that does not mean that money has
no influence. And even if money had no influence, lobbyists have many
other sources of influence. They have long-standing relationships and
friendships with key policymakers.21 7 They provide valuable expertise to
lawmakers.218  They enable lawmakers to work on certain priorities that
they share above others they do not.219 They are "in the know" in a town
where up-to-the-minute information is power.220 And when they represent
businesses, they come to the bargaining table from a position of strength.221
We have put forth some modest proposals for correcting the bias. The
first step is separating the roles of lobbyists and organizational fundraising.
PACs should be run by separate individuals and not by lobbyists, and
lobbyists should not be running campaigns. Secondly, we recommend the
adoption of a public defender model, establishing public funding for
lobbyists that represent diffuse, non-corporate interests. Neither measure
will eliminate the advantages concentrated interests have, but they can
certainly help to pull us closer to a system of more equal participation.
214. See generally Salisbury, supra note 168.
215. See generally id.
216. See generally Ansolabehere et al., supra note 46.
217. REVOLVING DOOR WORKING GROUP, A MATTER OF TRUST: HOW THE REVOLVING
DOOR UNDERMINES PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT-AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT,
supra note 85.
218. See generally THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EXPERTISE, supra note 46.
219. Richard Hall & Alan Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL. SCI.
REV., t (2006).
220. f
221. Charles E. Lindblom, The Market as Prison, 44 J. OF POL., t, 324-36 (1982).
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Top Spenders on Federal Lobbying by Client, 1998-2007
Client Total
US Chamber of Commerce $338,324,680
American Medical Ass'n $157,247,500
General Electric $149,990,000
American Hospital Ass'n $138,084,144
Pharmaceutical Rsrch & Mfrs. of America $115,008,600
AARP $112,732,064
Edison Electric Institute $107,132,628
National Ass'n of Realtors $103,890,000
Business Roundtable $101,660,000
Northrop Grumman $101,350,474
Blue Cross/Blue Shield $90,163,317
Lockheed Martin $87,797,702
Freddie Mac $86,164,048
Verizon Communications $83,407,022
Boeing Co. $82,038,310
General Motors $77,620,483
Philip Morris $75,500,000
Roche Group $74,888,942
Fannie Mae $73,857,000
Ford Motor Co. $71,312,808
Source: Senate Office of Public Records, via Center for Responsive Politics
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Table 2: Lobby Distribution
Grand Total Democrats Renublieans De .Repub
Business $1,133,433,773 $491,114,294 $625,787,18
-(7-1.7%)
Labor (4.2%) . $66,670,698 t $57,905,193_ $8,208,109
Ideological $131,735,468 $69,643,797 $59,630,058(8.3%)
Other (10.5%) $165,959,918 $85,343,365 $77,826,633
Unknown
Unknon .$82,310,396 $33,480,968 $47,147,128
(50.2%) C r R o PolItics
Source: Center for Responsive Politics
43% 55%
87% 12%
53% 45%
51% I 47%
41% 57%
Table 3: Top Spenders on Federal Lobbying by Sector, 2006
Rank Sector Amount Dems Repubs
1 Finance/Insur/RealEst $258,962,164 44% 54%
2 Ideology/Single-Issue $226,594,357 55% 44%
3 Other $166,179,223 51% 47%
4 Lawyers & Lobbyists $145,015,740 66% 33%
5 Misc Business $141,401,918 40% 59%
6 Health $99,976,485 37% 62%
7 Communication/Electronics $70,298,704 55% 44%
8 Labor $66,672,098 87% 12%
9 Construction $54,836,904 30% 70%
10 Energy/Nat Resource $47,627,102 25% 74%
11 Agribusiness $44,702,079 31% 68%
12 Transportation $39,232,847 28% 72%
13 Defense $17,923,552 38% 60%
Source: Center for Responsive Politics
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